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CHAPTER 3 
California's Fla wed 
Surface Water Rights 
MICHAEL HANEMANN, CAITLIN DYCKNIAN, 
AND DAMIAN PARK 
IN THE BEGINNING: A CHAOTIC SITUATION 
California sprang into existence following the discovery of gold in 
1848. Aside from domestic use, the first major use of water in Califor-
nia was in mining. The first mining consisted of placer mining of allu-
vial deposits in stream beds throughout the Sierra foothills . As those 
deposits were depleted, hydraulic mining arose, in which high-pressure 
jets of water were used to remove overlying earth from upland gold-
bearing deposits. That type of mining, first employed in 1853, required 
substantial water diversions. 
When California entered the Union in I 8 50, the English common 
law was adopted as the "rule of decision" in courts, including the doc-
trine of riparian rights for surface water1 (it was also the governing 
doctrine in the rest of the Union). Riparian rights entitle the owner of 
land bordering a surface water body ("riparian" land) to use the water 
on his or her riparian land. This is a right to use water, not a right of 
ownership, and it inheres only in riparian lands. Riparian rights remain 
with the riparian land regardless of changes in ownership. Water under 
a riparian right cannot be used on non.riparian land.2 The right is shared 
equally among all riparians: they own access to the stream as "tenants 
in common." They can divert water as long as this does not impair the 
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rights of other riparians. No specific quantity attaches to a riparian 
right. If a riparian originally applied X, this does not preclude him from 
applying 5X later. Nonuse does not terminate the right. There is no 
recording of the volume diverted . No institution administers the ripar-
ian right. Disputes are resolved through litigation among riparians. 
The riparian doctrine was logical where it originated, in a humid region 
with plentiful streamflow. Stream.flow is treated as a common pool to be 
shared among all riparian landowners. But in an arid region like Califor-
nia, where rivers can run dry by the late summer and annual streamflow 
can vary by an order of magnitude, there needs to be a specific mechanism 
for allocating limited stream.flow. The riparian right lacks this. 
Using water for hydraulic mining violated riparian requirements. In 
most cases, the deposits being mined were not located on riparian land. 
And the miners did not own the land where water was being diverted or 
used-these were public lands. Consequently, a new type of water right 
was developed, adapted from the rules developed by miners for the 
right to a mining claim. The miners "met and organized mining dis-
tricts, adopting rules for the definition of their property rights .... 
These rules limited the size of claims .... They required miners to post 
notices of their claims and to record them with district recorders .... To 
retain their claims, miners had to work them with diligence .... When 
questions of right arose, they were settled by reference to priority ... 
first in time, first in right." With the emergence of hydraulic mining, 
"the miners applied the same rules to water as they had to land-first in 
time, first in right. To perfect the right, ditches had to be dug with dili-
gence and the water applied to beneficial use" (Dunbar I983, 61). 
In 18 51, the California legislature endorsed the mining-camp rules as 
state law. Subsequently, district courts applied the principle of first pos-
session to water cases. In 1855, the California Supreme Court endorsed 
what became known as the appropriative water right. The right to 
divert water is based on the time and quantity of the initial diversion 
creating that right. The link between ownership of land and ownership 
of water is severed. The locations of water diversion and application 
can be different . If there is too little streamflow, the senior appropriators 
divert their full quantity until the stream is exhausted, while the remain-
ing (junior) appropriators receive nothing.3 
The Supreme Court's rulings did not extinguish the concept of a 
riparian right, and California courts continued to uphold it. In I866 
and r870, Congress gave recognition to appropriative rights. In I872, 
California's legislature formally recognized appropriative rights and 
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codified the procedures for acquiring them. The codification maintained 
a dual system of appropriative and riparian rights. 
While the appropriative water right was modeled after the right to a 
mining claim, crucial differences existed between the two resources that 
rendered the right less well suited to water than to mining. The nature 
of the economic activity was not the same, and the institutions for 
recording and enforcing the property right functioned very differently. 
According to Clay and Wright (2005, 163), gold mining was "a race 
to find a small number of high payoff claims." As they note ( 157): "Typ-
ically a miner worked a claim only long enough to determine its poten-
tial. If he decided it was a relatively low-value claim-as most were-he 
continued the search [elsewhere] .. .. Because miners were continually 
looking for new and better sites even as they worked their present hold-
ings, mining district rules were as much concerned with procedures for 
the abandonment and repossession of claims as they were with protec-
tion of the rights of existing claimholders." Mining was thus different 
from a production-oriented activity such as irrigated agriculture. Mining 
rules sought to ensure the "orderly turnover" of mining sites to maxi-
mize the chance of a bonanza discovery, not to promote land settlement. 
The interactions among miners were fundamentally different from 
those among water users, and played out over a much larger spatial 
scale. For a miner, the question was "Is someone else working a claim 
at this location? If not, I will." For an irrigator, it was not enough to 
know whether someone else was diverting water at this location: it was 
also necessary to know whether other diversions were occurring on the 
same stream.4 
Mining districts provided a nongovernmental apparatus that was 
quite effective in recording mining claims. Posting a claim at the site and 
recording it with the mining district was a reasonable procedure. Fur-
thermore, the mining districts played some role in mining claim enforce-
ment and dispute resolution. Mining district codes typically specified 
procedures for settling disputes over contested claims (Clay and Wright 
2005, 163-67), although those procedures were not necessarily final. 
While imperfect, the system based on mining districts, the posting of 
claims, and the right of first possession was relatively coherent and pro-
moted its objective: orderly and rapid exploration of mining sites. 
The situation with appropriative water rights was entirely different. 
In an arid region, land is worthless without water, and the objective was 
to ensure continued access to water. Because of the spatial scale of 
potential interactions among competing water users, posting a claim 
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along a river bank on a two-foot stake was a much less transparent 
means of recording a property right for water than for mining. Property 
right quantification was inherently less precise. The spatial area claimed 
for exploration was essential to mining. With water, the volume of 
water diverted during some time at a particular location comprised the 
claim. But volume is a problematic measure of this right, because the 
diversion occurs intermittently; the exercise of the property right is not 
uniform over time, as with a land claim. 
In additional to being poorly quantified and not transparently re-
corded, another crucial difference between an appropriative water right 
and a mining claim was that the former lacked any administrative appa-
ratus for verifying or enforcing the priority date or the amount of the 
right. The mining districts played no role in the recording or enforce-
ment of appropriative water rights, even for hydraulic mining, and there 
was no other entity, governmental or nongovernmental, that performed 
this role. In the event of a dispute among water users, whether about the 
seniority or the quantity of a right, the only recourse was litigation. 
Litigation has many weaknesses as a method of dispute resolution. 
Litigation is time-consuming. And water use for irrigation is especially 
time-sensitive-crops need water during the growing season . Litigation 
could not resolve a dispute in time to save that year's crop. Litigation 
was costly. The decree bound only the parties to the litigation, not other 
water users omitted from the litigation .5 Finally, there was no mecha-
nism to enforce a judicial decree resulting from litigation, except further 
litigation for contempt of court (Chandler 1913, 149). 
Given the differences in the nature of the resource and the way it was 
used, mining claims provided a poor analogy for water use . .The system 
of appropriative water rights based on the right of first possession was 
considerably less coherent than the system of mining claims based on 
the same principle. 
The 1872 code changed things marginally. Under that code, in addi-
tion to posting the claim at the river bank, a water user was required to 
file a copy with the county recorder and to commence construction of 
the diversion facility within 60 days of posting. But the county recorder 
played no role in verifying the claim to an appropriative water right, 
checking whether there was sufficient streamflow for that amount to 
have been diverted as claimed, checking whether construction was initi-
ated (or completed), monitoring diversions to ensure subsequent con-
formity with the water right, or sharing information about appropria-
tive rights claimed with other counties bordering the same stream. 
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Moreover, 11onstat11tory appropriations were still legal-made, as 
before 1872, by posting a notice at the site of the diversion and without 
recording the claim with the county recorder. A property rights scheme 
lacking effective recording and enforcement is a contradiction in terms. 
Yet that characterizes the appropriative right to water in California 
until 1914. 
WHAT OTHER STATES DID 
After the California Gold Rush, other major discoveries of gold occurred 
in Colorado (1858-1859), Nevada (1859), Idaho (1860), Montana 
(1862-1864), and Arizona (r863}, leading to immigration into those 
states. Like California, they adopted the English common law and, with 
it, riparian water rights. In those gold rushes, as in California, the min-
ers organized mining districts and adopted rules to protect claims to 
mining rights and to water. As in California, the mining was being con-
ducted on public lands and required something other than a riparian 
right. The new mining districts copied California in adopting an appro-
priative right to water based on the right of first possession, which was 
subsequently recognized by the state courts and legislatures. 
Colorado was the first western state to enact laws for the administra-
tion of surface water rights. This came about gradually. In 1861, in its 
first session, the territorial legislature endorsed "the records, laws and 
proceedings of each mining district," and also enacted a statute author-
izing the appropriation of water for irrigation of both riparian and non-
riparian lands. Under this law, there was no requirement to record the 
appropriation. The first court decision dealing with appropriative 
rights, in 1872, upheld this as a necessity in Colorado's climate. In 
r 876, the state constitution stated that "priority of appropriation shall 
give the better right as between those using water for the same pur-
pose." The question of whether riparian rights still existed in Colorado 
was answered in 1882 when the state Supreme Court declared that the 
riparian doctrine was "inapplicable to Colorado." Eventually, all the 
mountain states followed Colorado in establishing prior appropriation 
as the exclusive right to surface water. 6 
At first, following the r86r legislation, appropriative water rights in 
Colorado functioned in the same incoherent manner as in California, 
with no recording requirement and no state administrative apparatus for 
verification, enforcement or monitoring. As in California, there was 
chaos, and "it was impossible to determine the number and priorities of 
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the appropriations of a stream except through an expensive adjudication 
lawsuit" (Dunbar 1983, 87). The drought of 1874 triggered interest in a 
new legislative solution when diverters along the Cache la Poudre River 
failed to agree on how to divide the depleted streamflow, and upstream 
diverters with junior rights "took what they wanted, depriving the down-
stream appropriators of their legitimate supply of irrigation water" {87). 
Legislation in 1879 established ten water districts around the state, 
each with a water commissioner who was to enforce the distribution of 
water based on prior rights . The water commissioners had no powers to 
determine the priority of rights or resolve conflicts regarding rights. 
Instead, judges could initiate an inquiry into a water right and make a 
finding. This legislation was subsequently challenged because it gave 
judges the power to initiate an inquiry on their own authority without 
waiting for someone to .file a suit in the conventional manner. The 1881 
Adjudication Act resolved this: it required irrigators with existing 
appropriative rights to file their claims for priority with district courts 
by June 1881 to determine the priority and quantity of their right. 
The Colorado system was only partly successful. The administrative 
system for enforcing court water rights decrees worked well and was 
widely admired and emulated. But the reliance on judges was problem-
atic: they did not consult with the state engineer, lacked engineering 
training, and typically did not verify the accuracy of data presented in 
court. Consequently, irrigators made extravagant claims, which judges 
then accepted. The water rights decreed by the courts varied erratically, 
with no rationale or relation to actual use (Meade 1903, 149-55). 
The situation improved slowly. In 1887, statewide recording of 
appropriative rights claims was initiated (Meade 1903, 144). In 1899, 
the water commissioners received additional powers, including the 
power to arrest and prosecute anyone violating orders for the opening or 
closing of head-gates. In 1903 and 1919, the Colorado legislature com-
pleted the adjudication procedure. The 1903 Adjudication Act provided 
the courts with authority to adjudicate all other appropriative water 
rights in the same manner as irrigation rights. The 1919 Adjudication 
Limitation Act was designed to settle the priorities of all water rights. It 
required any claimant to an appropriation to submit the claim for adju-
dication by January 1921; failure to do so caused a presumption of aban-
donment (Hobbs 1999, 9). 
In 1886 and 1888, the neighboring state of Wyoming largely copied 
Colorado's legislation of 1879 and r88r. It soon found the same defects 
as in Colorado: "there was no central register of appropriation claims . . . . 
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Many of the streams were overappropriated, and few had been adjudi-
cated. Of those that had been [adjudicated] the decreed rights were 
excessive and inconsistent" (Dunbar r983, ro6). Reacting to this situa-
tion, on attaining statehood in 1890, the Wyoming legislature created an 
administrative system for the control of water rights. The admjnistrative 
apparatus both conferred water rights (handled by courts in Colorado) 
and administered them. 
The Wyoming system created water divisions and a Board of Control 
consisting of the State Engineer and the superintendents of the water divi-
sions. A person wishing to appropriate water applied for a permit from 
the State Engineer. If the State Engineer determined that unappropriated 
water was available and the diversion was not "detrimental to the public 
welfare," the permit was granted. No appropriation after 1890 was valid 
without a permit. The division superintendents monitored diversions and 
enforced priority. The Board of Control adjudicated streams, subject to 
appeal to the district courts. 
The permit procedure did not apply retroactively to water rights 
acquired before 1890, but the 1890 legislation specified a procedure to 
address those rights. Under the stream adjudication process, the owners 
of all water rights, including those acquired before 1890, were required 
to file their claim with the State Board of Control. Failure to do this 
extinguished the right (Squillace 1991, 97) . Under this scheme, all of 
Wyoming's streams were adjudicated by 1922; any users who failed to 
claim a pre-1890 right lost it (Squillace 1989, 324). 
Over the period of 1895-1909, other western states adopted versions 
of the Wyoming system.7 Only Oregon copied Colorado's court-based 
determination of water rights. The Wyoming system aroused contro-
versy for vesting the determination of water rights in an administrative 
board rather than the courts. Engineers supported this, but lav.ryers and 
some water users opposed it. After 1902, the federal government advo-
cated it as a precondition for receiving water projects from the new 
Bureau of Reclamation, which proved decisive. 
In summary, all the other western states moved to systems for the 
conferral, recording, and administration of appropriative rights that, 
while not perfect, were comprehensive and orderly. Those systems gen-
erated usable records of rights holders and their seniority. Moreover, 
there was a local administrative apparatus for monitoring diversions, 
ensuring conformity with the decreed appropriative right, and enforc-
ing seniority in the event of shortage. Of all the states, Colorado was the 
most successful at verifying water rights. In some other states, gaps still 
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remain between the amounts of water claimed and actually put to ben-
eficial use (Tarlock 2000, 882). Nevertheless, there is a relatively coher-
ent system for recording, monitoring, and enforcing appropriative 
water rights. 
WHAT CALIFORNIA DID 
While other western states regularized the administration of appropria-
tive rights, California did nothing, even as the use of water for irrigation 
grew dramatically. The acreage irrigated in California increased from 
roughly 60,000 acres in 1870 to 300,000 acres in 1880, and then to r.4 
million acres in 1900, 2. 7 million acres in r9ro, and 4.2 million acres 
in 1920 (Rhode 1995, table 1). The expansion was partly associated 
with the assemblage of large land holdings, often obtained through 
dubious acquisitions of Spanish land grants and fraudulent acquisitions 
of public lands disposed under the 1850 Swamp Act and the 1877 
Desert Land Act. Public land purchases were legally restricted to 3 20 
acres per capita under the former and 640 acres under the latter, but 
those restrictions were blatantly evaded. For example, Henry Miller, the 
largest landowner in California, acquired a 100-mile swathe of riparian 
land along the San Joaquin River and 50 miles of riparian land along 
the Kern River, much of it obtained fraudulently under the Swamp Act. 
The abusive acquisition of land was accompanied by a stretching, if 
not abuse, of water rights. "Owners of riparian land have ... . rented 
and sold water claimed und_er the riparian doctrine to those who irri-
gate non-riparian lands, and the right to do this has been sustained in 
repeated judicial decisions" (Meade 1903, 194). Other landowners 
claimed appropriative rights and used those to monopolize land that 
they did not own. They could do this because of the permissive system 
for claiming appropriative rights and the legal ambiguity then existing: 
Was the amount of the right the amount actually being used, the amount 
that could be used given the canal capacity, or the amount the appro-
priator aspired to use in future? (Pisani 2002, 38). For example, while 
the average flow of the Kings River varied from 5,000 to 10,000 cfs in 
flood season and from 500 to r,ooo cfs during the low-flow period, the 
claims to Kings River water amounted to 750,000 cfs, exclusive of mul-
tiple claims to the entire river flow. On the San Joaquin River, six enti-
ties each claimed the entire average flow, and the remaining claims 
totaled 8 times its maximum flow-152 times its average flow (Meade 
1903, 190). 
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James Haggin and two partners owned 400,000 acres of land in Kern 
County by 1878, but claimed appropriative rights for water to irrigate 
two million acres, many times more than the Kern River ever carried . 
As their holdings grew, they collided with the downstream riparian 
rights of Henry Miller. During a severe drought in 1877, their upstream 
diversions dewatered Mi ll er's lands. In May 1879, Miller sued Haggin 
and others. The case was tried in 18 8 1, leading to a decision for Hag-
gin. The California Supreme Court heard the case in 1883 and 1884 
and ruled for Miller. The majority opinion held that riparian rights were 
still va lid in California. This generated inunense public controversy, 
and the court agreed to rehear the case. The final decision, in April 
1886, again favored Miller. The court ruled tha t riparian rights counted 
as property rights under common law, and property rights, once vested, 
could not be taken without compensation.8 
California's dual system of inconsistent water rights was thus perma-
nently enshrined. Riparian rights were inherently unquantified. Appro-
priative rights were quantified incoherently, if at all, and unregulated. 
The only mechanism for resolving disputes, which abounded, was liti-
gation. But, as Pisani (1984, 338) notes : "The legal system resolved few 
water rights conflicts .... In the absence of a state engineering office, 
the courts relied almost entirely on biased witnesses for hydrographic 
information . . . . In any case, court tests rarely included all interested 
parties, so the decisions were invariably incomplete. Then, too, enforc-
ing a court decree was no easy matter; contempt proceedings were 
expensive and subject to the same delays as water rights suits." Some 
litigation was epic in its scale. The Kings River was notorious. Litiga-
tion began in the drought year of 1876 and escalated, totaling 137 suits 
by 1917. The piecemeal judgments in those suits produced some strik-
ing anomalies, such as places where "A had rights superior to B, who 
had rights superior to C, who had rights superior to A" (Governor's 
Commission 1978, 24). 
Support for water law reform grew during the drought of 1898-99, 
but it was blocked by water users . Change finally came after the election 
of a reform governor (Hiram Johnson) and a reform legislature in 19ro. 
In 19II, the legislature declared that "All water or the use of water 
within the State of California is the property of the people of the State 
of California" (Cal. Stats. 19 II, 821 }. It created a State Conservation 
Commission to examine the need for new laws to control use of the 
state's natural resources. The commission's recommendations were 
enacted in the Water Commission Act of 1913. Challenged by water 
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users, the legislation was put on the ballot. It was approved by the vot-
ers and took effect in December 1914. 
The legislation established a State Water Commission, with the 
power to regulate unappropriated surface waters of the state. A person 
wishing to appropriate water after December 1914 applied to the com-
mission for a permit. If the commission determined that surplus water 
was available, the permit was granted. The permit holder then had the 
right to take and use the water according to the permit terms. Upon 
compliance with the permit terms and demonstration of beneficial use, 
the commission issued a license which confirmed the appropriative 
right. The commission's authority was initially nondiscretionary: if the 
applicant followed the prescribed procedures and unappropriated water 
was available, the permit had to be issued . In 1917, the commission was 
given discretion to refuse applications deemed detrimenta l to the public 
welfare . In 1921, it was given the power to grant a right "under such 
terms and conditions" as it judges "in the public interest" and to reject 
applications not in the public interest. 
Once it had issued a permit or a license, the commission had on ly "a 
limited role in resolving disputes and e11forci11g rights of water holders, 
a task left mainly to the courts." 9 Thus, while the 1913 act allowed for 
the administrative conferral of an appropriative (post-1914) right, as in 
Wyoming, the resolution of any subsequent disputes among water right 
holders was still left to the courts, as in Colorado . There were two 
routes by which the commission might enter such disputes . First, under 
the court "reference" procedure, a court was permitted to transfer a 
case to the commission to act as referee. Second, upon its own initiative 
or upon request of a water right holder, the commission could conduct 
a statutory adjudication of the stream, determining all appropriative 
rights to water, whether issued before or after 1914. If they wished, 
water users could obtain a judicial review prior to a final decree. 
The California system had two key differences from those of Colo-
rado and Wyoming. First, Colorado and \Xlyoming arranged for appro-
priative rights predating the reform legislation to be brought under that 
legislation and adjudicated, whereas California's commission lacked 
authority over pre-1914 rights, except in the case of a court reference or 
statutory adjudication. Second, while Colorado's water districts and 
Wyoming's water divisions provided an administrative apparatus to 
supervise the distribution of water, monitoring diversions to ensure con-
formity with water rights, no such arrangement existed in California. 
Supervision of water distribution was opposed by water users at the 
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Conservation Commission's hearings; it was dropped by the commission 
chair "in a spirit of conciliation. " 10 At the time, commentators saw the 
omission of public supervision of water distribution as a serious flaw. 11 
The Water Commission had no authority over riparian rights. The 
Conservation Commission had wanted to abolish riparian rights but 
felt unable to do this (Milter 198 5, r2). Instead, the r 9 r 3 act stipulated 
that unused riparian water would be forfeited after ro years of nonuse. 
However, the Water Commission had little power to enforce this-
riparians could seek relief with the courts-and it was declared uncon-
stitutional in 1935. 12 
Once in operation, the Water Commission issued biennial reports. 
The first report, in 1917, identified two weaknesses in the 1913 act: lack 
of detail regarding procedures for a statutory adjudication, and the lack 
of power to supervise water distribution. The legislature responded by 
enacting details for an adjudication but did nothing regarding supervi-
sion of water distribution. The commission's second biennial report, in 
1918, note<l the consequences: "The irrigation season of 1918 has been 
one of unusually low run-off. For most streams in northern California, 
at least, the run-off this season is the lowest recorded. A number of 
requests have been received asking the Commission to send a repre-
sentative to take charge of the distribution of the water of streams" 
(17)-but it lacked authority to do so. The legislature still did nothing. 
The drought worsened during the winter of 1919-20. It coincided 
with a dramatic increase in rice acreage in the Sacramento Valley, which 
required more water than other crops. The rice acreage grew from roo 
acres in 1910 an<l 15,000 acres in 1914 to 154,700 acres in 1920 (Cal-
ifornia State Water Commission 1921, 71). In February, the commis-
sion issued a warning of an impending water shortage. The situation 
was exacerbated by the lack of reliable data on water rights in the Sac-
ramento Valley (153). The problem was eventually solved by voluntary 
action, without the commission's intervention and without enforcement 
of seniority. Various agencies organized an Emergency Water Conserva-
tion Conference, which included representatives of water users in the 
Sacramento Valley. The conference persuaded growers to reduce rice 
plantings by 50,000 acres an<l to ensure that water was used "with all 
due economy .... Irrigation water was never handled so carefully in the 
Sacramento Valley as it was during the summer of 1920" (154-55). 
Though the crisis passed, it highlighted "the necessity for an early deter-
mination of the underlying rights to divert water from the Sacramento 
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"there is absolutely no basis for a diversion of water among the various 
claimants in periods of shortage" (155). 
The commission's T921 report noted a deluge of applications for new 
permits, "far in excess of the natural summer flow" of all the streams in 
California, which "has now been fully appropriated and put to use." 
Consequently, "the greater portion of the required additional supply 
must be developed by the construction of storage reservoirs and regula-
tion of stream flow, holding the flood runoff for use during periods of 
low natural flow" (12). Despite the interest in new reservoir projects, 
such projects faced the challenge of "how storage water can be released 
into a natural stream with assurance of its escaping illegal diversion 
before reaching its destination, or how such a reservoir can be operated 
to the satisfaction of prior and vested rights of downstream water users" 
(13). To answer those questions, the commission believed that Califor-
nia needed "a complete water code"; still lacking were "detailed provi-
sions for the public supervision of the distribution of water ... in 
accordance with defined rights, and the appointment of water masters 
when needed" (15). Accordingly, it proposed amendments to the 1913 
act . There was partial success. The appointment of water masters to 
control the use of water was authorized, but only upon written request 
of the owners of at least r 5 percent of the diversion facilities in the 
region. The recommendation for supervision of water distribution was 
ignored. 
Thus, when California did finally act, it conceded to politically pow-
erful interests. Compared to other western states, the California com-
mission was weakened by the exclusion of riparian rights and pre-1914 
appropriative rights, and had little power to enforce post-1914 appro-
priative rights. 
CONSOLIDATION 
In July 1921, the commission ceased existence. A new Department of 
Public Works came into existence, and the commission's functions and 
duties were assumed by its Division of Water Rights. In its 1924 report, 
looking back to the 1913 act, the division observed that, when the com-
mission started, it had "faced a most difficult situation" because of "the 
maze of legal entanglement" associated with riparian and pre-1914 
appropriative rights. It conceded that the legal situation had not 
changed, "nor has litigation over water matters been done away with. 
It has, however, been greatly reduced" (9). 
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Given the lack of authority over riparian and pre-1914 appropriative 
rights, and the small quantity of post-1914 appropriative rights, how 
was litigation reduced? Two tools existed for determining pre-1914 
rights (the court reference procedure and statutory adjudication), and 
one tool for supervising the distribution of water under existing rights 
(a water master). But either a court or the water users had to request 
these actions. 13 All the commission or division could do on its own 
authority was to conduct special hydrological investigations; field inves-
tigations were also part of reviewing permit applications and determin-
ing whether unappropriated water was available. Those investigations 
turned out to be crucial. 
The investigations had a "moral effect," because "technical and legal 
information on points formally so obscure can now be secured from an 
authoritative and impartial source. The assistance of the Division is 
sought in controversies over water matters not necessarily within the 
scope of the [1913] act" (Division of Water Rights 1924, ro). As the 
division noted: 
In any legal controversy over water it is most often the questions of fact 
which are at issue .... Whether or not the Division has any quasi-judicial 
function, it can, if it is in possession of the facts regarding conditions on a 
stream, make known these facts to the interested parties in the issue and the 
matter is then susceptible of compromise .... The Division acts in the nature 
of a bureau in answering questions regarding water right principles. In this, 
it has been of much service in settling difficulties, in clearing up a number of 
intricate water tangles, and in bringing together those who desired an equi-
table settlement of their difficulties, but were in doubt as how best to pro-
ceed. It is believed that much useless and expensive litigation has been 
avoided through this service. (Division of Water Rights 1922, 9) 
Thus, the division saw "its largest function" as "a fact finding and 
recording body" (9 ). 
Three factors helped the division bring some order to the tangle of 
water rights. First, in assessing permit applications it bypassed "paper" 
water rights and focused on whether unappropriated flow was available. 
Frequently, "those claiming vested rights admit that there is unappropri-
ated water available to a new appropriator in the source from which they 
are already diverting and do not object to a new diversion, provided their 
prior rights are respected" (Division of Water Rights 1924, 38). Second, 
in 1923 the division was allowed to modify its procedure for protested 
permit applications: it could now hold a hearing before the decision, 
instead of afterwards. This had substantial procedural and psychological 
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impacts. "Particularly in the la rger and more important cases, the action 
of the Division is expedited, as each of the contesting parties assumes a 
greater share of the burden in preparing his own case and presents it in 
better shape, thus overcoming the tendency for such matters to drag 
on .... It may also be noted that the hearing procedure through its for-
mality discourages trivial protests and has tended toward the adoption of 
a new mental attitude on the part of those whose interests are jeopardized 
by proposed appropriations." 14 Third, the division extended its influence 
through its readiness to conduct informal investigations. "While some 
[requests for a hydrographic investigation) come to the Division as 
requests for adjudication, others come as a request for an informal phys-
ical investigation. In some instances the existing rights are so complicated 
... that it is felt that the formal adjudication procedure might not be suc-
cessful; however, if the physical facts can be determined by investigation 
this will suffice" (Division of Water Rights 1922, 14). 
Thus, a degree of order came to California's water rights administra-
tion. But this occurred only if the water users invited it. Thus, water 
users on the Kings River decided in 1917 to end their litigation wars 
and request a water master, because they wanted a dam (the Pine Flat 
Dam) , for which a determi nation of existing water rights was needed 
(California State Water Commission 1921, 14). There were other cases 
where the water users wanted no intervention; there, the courthouse 
remained the only venue for dispute resolution. 
WATER MANAGEMENT TllROUGII TIIE COURTS 
One dispute involved upstream diversions and downstream water qual-
ity in the Delta. While the Delta waters are tidal, they are not saline, 
except in late summer and fall when low outflow from the Sacramento 
and San Joaquin Rivers permits saltwater to advance inland. During the 
1920 drought, the Sacramento River flow dropped by about 90 percent, 
to a record low of 420 cfs, coupled with record salinity intrusion into 
the Delta. In July 1920, the Delta town of Antioch sued upstream irriga-
tors in the Sacramento Valley to stop their diversions from causing 
salinity to reach the intake for the town's water supply (itself a diversion 
of less than T cfs). At least 3,500 cfs of Delta flow was needed for an 
acceptable salinity level. In 1922 the California Supreme Court rejected 
the suit because "it would be hard to conceive of a greater waste for so 
small a benefit" than to require that an addi tional 3,080 cfs flow unused 
to the ocean to provide less than 1 cfs for municipal use . 
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This case raised two fundamental issues. First, could a water right be 
used to regulate streamflow for water quality, in this case salinity? The 
Antioch court recognized that "an appropriator of water from a stream 
for domestic and similar uses has the right to enjoin the pollution of the 
stream above him," but considered that diverting water, as opposed to 
discharging something noxious into a stream, could not be considered 
an action "that in the least affects the purity of the water." Thus, stream-
flow was not a water quality parameter. Second, should the interests of 
downstream water users prevent the construction of upstream storage? 
The court noted that, if it acceded to Antioch's request, this would set a 
precedent that could impede the construction of storage, an outcome 
"highly detrimental to the public interests." 
Storage was of keen interest. The 1920 drought demonstrated that 
additional storage was needed to accommodate new applications for 
water rights. Also, since the early 1900s electric utilities had become 
interested in hydropower; these included Southern California Edison, 
which was looking to the headwaters of the San Joaquin River. 
The 1913 act limited annual water use on uncultivated riparian land 
to 2.5 acre-feet per acre. This was at issue in Herminghaus v. Southern 
California Edison (1926). The Herminghaus family owned undevel-
oped riparian land along the San Joaquin River, used for pasture and, 
since 1896, leased to Henry Miller. For forage, they had the practice of 
temporarily damming the river during the spring runoff so that it over-
flowed the land and produced a crop of natural grasses. Their 1913 act 
limit was approximately 54,000 acre-feet, but they diverted the entire 
river flood flow, around r.8 million acre-feet. Edison had riparian rights 
to the upper San Joaquin, and constructed its first hydropower facility 
in 1911. In the 1920s it was planning to expand that system. Its reser-
voirs would store water used to flood the Herminghaus lands, and Her-
minghaus sued. Edison claimed the right, as a riparian, to store water 
when the volume of flow far exceeded the needs of downstream irriga-
tors, releasing it in the late summer when irrigation water was in short 
supply while generating electricity for public use. Herminghaus argued 
that it had a riparian right to divert the flood water. 
The court ruled that the riparian right did include the use of flood 
waters, but it did not include storage, so Edison impounded water as a 
mere appropriator. The public benefit of Edison's reservoirs was irrele-
vant. At that time, California courts applied a standard of reasonable 
use in disputes among riparians, among appropriators, and between a 
riparian and an appropriator where the riparian claimed unreasonable 
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use by the appropriator. But they refused to apply reasonable use to a 
claim by an appropriator against a riparian. Following that principle, 
the lower court ruled for Herminghaus. On appeal, the California 
Supreme Court upheld the ruling. There was a wave of public outrage. 
There was also "a rash of new cases" against hydropower projects 
(Miller 1989, 103 ). In response, the legis lature placed a constitutional 
amendment on the ballot declaring that "the general welfare requires 
that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest 
extent of which they are capable," and required that all surface water 
use-riparian and appropriative alike-be reasonable and beneficial. 
The amendment passed in November 1928 . 
CONSTRUCTING A IIYDRAULIC SOCIETY 
By then, California was immersed in water projects. The notion of trans-
ferring surplus Sacramento River water to the drier San Joaquin Valley 
was first suggested in 1858 and was the subject of extensive investiga-
tions by the State Engineer, William Hammond Hall, in T877-88. It 
resurfaced in 1919 in a proposal by Robert Marshall. Prompted by the 
1920 drought, the legislature allocated funds for water resources investi-
gations and, following the 1924 drought, it allocated additional funds. 
The report, in 1927, offered a coordinated plan for developing the state's 
water resources (Division of Engineering and Irrigation 1927). That was 
a banner year. Besides placing the constitutional amendment on the bal-
lot, the legislature authorized the Department of Finance to file to reserve 
appropriative water rights that might be needed for a statewide water 
plan, with the notion that it would assign those rights only to users 
whose projects conformed to that plan .15 
In 1929, water planning move<l into high gear. The Division of Water 
Rights was combined with the Division of Engineering and Irrigation 
within the Department of Public Works to form a single Division of 
Water Resources. Funding was allocated for an expanded water plan-
ning effort. The product was a detailed proposal for a State Water Plan 
(Division of Water Resources 1931 ). The plan's main focus was to pro-
vide storage upstream in the Sacramento Valley and to transfer water to 
the San Joaquin Valley. 
In 1933, the legislature endorsed the project and authorized a bond 
issue, which was narrowly approved by voters. With California then in 
the depths of the Great Depression, the state made no attempt to sell 
the bonds. Instead, it turned to the federal government for help, first 
68 I Chapter Three 
seeking grant or loan assistance and then, with those not forthcoming, 
asking it to take over the project. In 19 3 5, President Roosevelt released 
emergency relief funds so that work could begin. In 19 3 7, Congress 
formally approved the Central Valley Project (CVP) as a Bureau of Rec-
lamation project. Construction of Shasta Dam started in 1937 and was 
completed in 1945; the hydropower and other ancillary facilities were 
completed in 19 50. Construction of Friant Dam also started in 193 7; it 
was completed in 1942. The Madera Canal was completed in 1945, and 
the Friant-Kern and Delta-Mendota Canals in 1951. 
The war led to a boom in California's agriculture and economy, and 
it continued afterwards . Irrigated acreage grew from 5 .1 million acres 
in 1939 to 6.6 million acres in 1949. The population increased from 6.9 
million in 1940 to ro.6 million in 19 50. The growth in potential demand 
for water clearly outstripped the supply expansion from the CVP. 
California, by then chafing at federal control of the CVP, created a 
water planning authority in 1945 and funded a state-wide water resources 
investigation in 1947. In 1951, a report was released proposing a new 
large dam in the Sacramento Valley and an aqueduct through the San 
Joaquin Valley to Southern California (California State Water Resources 
Board 19 51). That year, the legislature authorized what became the State 
Water Project (SWP) and appropriated funds for detailed engineering 
studies. This gained further momentum from a massive flood in 19 5 6 
which the new dam could have prevented. To implement the project, the 
Department of Water Resources was created that year as a superagency 
vested with all the powers and responsibilities relating to water from the 
Department of Public Works and other state agencies. In 1957, the depart-
ment issued the culminating product of the decade-long state water inves-
tigation, a comprehensive master plan for the SWP. In 1959, the legisla-
ture authorized bonds for the first stage of the SWP. This was the largest 
bond issue ever offered by any state, and it was made subject to voter 
approval. The bond was narrowly approved in an election in 1960; the 
northern counties, reluctant to send "their" water south, rejected the pro-
posal; the southern counties, containing the majority of the beneficiaries, 
provided the margin of victory. 
Meanwhile, the CVP was also being expanded. Folsom Dam was com-
pleted in 1956, and Trinity Dam in 1963. The CVP division delivering 
water to the west side of the Sacramento Valley was largely completed by 
1965. The new CVP and SWP dams released water into the Sacramento 
River to flow into the Delta for pumping southward. This required addi-
tional pumping capacity in the Delta and additional conveyance capacity 
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in the San Joaquin Valley. These were supplied through a federal-state 
partnership, which included a new aqueduct. The federal portion was 
known as the San Luis Aqueduct. The SWP portion, known as the Cali-
fornia Aqueduct, carried water over into Southern California. Construc-
tion of the CVP portion was completed in 1968, and of the SWP portion 
in 1973. With that, California 's modern hydraulic system was in place. 
That system represented a strategy of supply expansion rather than 
more efficient management of existing resources. What was the role of 
water rights in the strategy? 
The 1928 constitutional amendment was crucial. Without it, most of 
the new dams could not have been built. However, following a 1935 
Supreme Court ruling, the reasonable use doctrine fell into dormancy, 
losing the effective abi lity to restrict wasteful water use. Also, when the 
Division of Water Rights was folded into the Division of Water Resources 
in 1929, this reduced the resources and attention devoted to water rights 
administration. 
The projects' financing was based on water users' paying the cost of 
the water supplied by the project. For those receiving water from the 
new CVP canals, that amount could readily be quantified. 16 Not so for 
users diverting water from the San Joaquin or Sacramento River. With 
the San Joaquin River, which would be dried up downstream of Friant 
Dam, the diverters would receive a like amount of water from the Delta-
Mendota Canal as a free replacement. 17 The Shasta and Trinity Dams 
changed the seasonal timing and volume of Sacramento River stream-
flow, producing less flow in the spring but more in the late summer, and 
created the risk that existing diverters would grab the augmented late-
season flow. These diverters could divert the amount of their pre-exist-
ing right to river water (their base supply) for free; if they wished, they 
could divert an extra quantity, for which they paid (project water). 18 
Determining those quantities of water was problematic. For existing 
users with riparian rights, there was no quantity associated with their 
right. For users with pre-1914 appropriative rights, those rights 
remained unquantified because they were outside the Water Commis-
sion Act's purview. For users with post-1914 rights senior to the CVP, 
the loose administration of post-1914 water rights made those quanti-
ties uncertain, too. 
The burden of negotiating quantities fell on the CVP and SWP. This 
was harder in the Sacramento Valley than in the San Joaquin Valley. 
In the San Joaquin Valley, a key factor was Henry Miller's domi-
nance. He had been exceptionally litigious in protecting his water rights . 
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A 193 3 suit against the Madera Irrigation District had generated "nearly 
a complete adjudication of rights" to the San Joaquin River upstream of 
Mendota Pool (Graham 1950, 597). Moreover, his company was now 
in a period of decline and, for several reasons, "needed to sell its water 
rights before it lost them" (Garone 2011, 165). In 1939, it reached an 
agreement w ith Reclamation to sell the water that flooded its pasture 
lands, and it received an exchange contract to provide substitute water 
for its irrigated croplands in the San Joaquin Valley. The agreement 
became the model for contracts with other riparian landowners and 
ultimately fixed the level of their compensation (Miller 1992, 173). 19 
In the Sacramento Valley, there were many small landowners, with 
no dominant land owner like Miller and little prior litigation that might 
have quantified water rights. Impounded water flowed along the river 
channel to the Delta. The legal point for CVP and S\VP diversions was 
near the Delta, several hundred miles downstream from the points of 
storage, with many intervening users in between. As the state's chief 
water lawyer warned in 1942, whether an adequate amount of project 
water would be available for export depended "upon the degree to 
which the rights of these intervening users are defined with exactitude, 
as well as the extent to which those users vo luntarily confine themselves 
thereto. In the existing condition of human nature it may be confidently 
predicted that [they], finding an abnormal increment in the stream, will 
each for himself define and exercise their rights in their own favor 
with substantial elasticity" (Holsinger 1942, 13). Exactitude in the def-
inition of those rights required a statutory adjudication. The Reclama-
tion supervisor in Sacramento had recommended this in 1939, but his 
superiors in Washington rejected it. California now proposed this in 
December 1942, but Washington again rejected it . By 1951, with the 
CVP in full operation, the situation had worsened. Sacramento Valley 
diversions, which had averaged about 1 mi ll ion acre-feet annually from 
1924 to 1940, soared to 2 million acre-feet in 1951. More diversions 
meant less project exports . Reclamation leadership was concerned 
enough to consider requesting an adjudication. At that point, the water 
users in the Valley brought Congressional pressure on Reclamation to 
abandon that notion (Bain, Caves, and Margolis 1966, 477 ). For 
another decade, Reclamation and the Sacramento River water users 
continued to disagree about water amounts for settlement contracts. 
Finally, after 20 years of negotiations, and under pressure from the Sec-
retary of the Interior, Reclamation began signing settlement contracts 
in 1964. 
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THE WATER RIGHTS BOARD ERA 
To prevent further conflict of interest, the 1956 reorganization that cre-
ated the Department of Water Resources to operate the S\W also estab-
lished a separate entity, the State Water Rights Board (SWRB), which 
assumed the responsibilities of the Department of Public Works regard-
ing surface water rights. The new SWRB was a diminished version of 
the 1920s Division of Water Rights, and had less ability to manage post-
r9T 4 rights. It lost the authority to provide water master service, which 
stayed with the Department of Water Resources. That department also 
retained many experienced staff, including engineers employed in field 
investigations to measure water diversions, which "severely handi-
capped" the SWRB and limited its effectiveness (California State Water 
Rights Board 1957, 34). It faced a "heavy backlog" of applications for 
new permits, accumulated "over a long period of years" (Holsinger 
1957, 686). 
With new applications, the SWRB tightened the information require-
ments to validate the amount of water claimed. But it was in a weak 
position with respect to existing rights, lacking authority over riparian 
and pre-1914 rights, and with few resources to monitor post-1914 
rights. 20 There was no more collection of data on diversions. 21 In 1965, 
an ineffectual attempt was made to change this, motivated by concerns 
over uncapped riparian diversions. Riparians and appropriators with 
both pre- and post-1914 rights were required to file a statement every 
three years with the SWRB detailing their monthly diversions. 22 But the 
information was "for information purposes only," and failure to file 
lacked legal consequences. Smaller diverters in the Delta and others 
received exemptions. The result was little compliance: in 1978, only ro 
percent of holders of riparian and pre-1914 rights filed statements.23 
The SWRB was also in a weak position to address the water projects. 
Though the CVP's permits had not yet been issued-this was the imme-
diate task for the SWRB-it was delivering water on a massive scale as 
a fait accomp/i. The SWRB could approve permits for the CVP (and 
SWP) only if ( 1) unappropriated water was available, ( 2) this was in the 
public interest, and (3) it di<l not impair existing vested rights. That 
depended on the amount of water controlled by existing vested rights, 
something not clearly known and beyond the authority of the SWRB to 
determine. 24 There had been a conscious decision in 1939-42 and in 
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In its first CVP decision in 1958 (D-893), the SWRB considered 
applications to divert American River water by the CVP, the city of 
Sacramento, and various others, significantly exceeding the river flow. 
There also were state applications for future water developments in 
upstream counties, and flows for fish conservation requested by the 
Department of Fish and Game. There were multiple protests, including 
claims that the diversions would harm vested rights downstream by 
increasing salinity in the Delta. The SWRB rejected most of the applica-
tions but granted the CVP and Sacramento applications, subject to (1) 
future agreements among the parties to control Delta salinity, (2) future 
reductions for within-watershed development, and (3) compliance with 
recent Fish and Game agreements for fish flows. 25 This set the pattern 
for CVP and SWP applications : the SWRB granted the projects' applica-
tions 011 an interim basis subject to the resolution of ongoing negotia-
tions about vested water rights, salinity levels, and/or fish conditions. At 
intervals, the SWRB reopened the decision process, heard evidence, and 
made a new interim decision on similar terms. This pattern of deference 
to negotiations among the interested parties continues to the present 
day, and the negotiations remain largely unresolved.16 
\Vhat did change was the growing power of environmental concerns. 
In 1949, California adopted the first comprehensive water pollution 
control law in the United States, creating a statewide water pollution 
control agency. By 1961, interest in water quality had broadened beyond 
human health protection: enhancement of fish and wildlife resources 
was declared an official purpose of the SWP. The issue of salinity in the 
Delta refused to go away. In the 1940s, the CVP's strategy was to rely 
on releases from Shasta to control salinity in the Delta. In the r95os, the 
CVP backed away from that commitment. The Delta was the hub for 
moving project water to agricultural and urban users in the San Joaquin 
Valley and Southern California. Salinity in the Delta mattered to users 
both there and in export areas. In 19 59, the Delta Protection Act was 
passed, mandating that the Delta be kept fresh enough for these pur-
poses. Freshwater releases not only reduced salinity but also protected 
fish and the Delta's aquatic ecosystem. The two concerns became mutu-
ally reinforcing. A 1966 legislative report asserted that downstream 
water quality was receiving inadequate attention from the SWRB: "The 
problem of resolving the protection which the Delta water users should 
receive, based on their vested rights, is beyond the ability of the pres-
ently organized SWRB to solve" (California Assembly Interim Commit-
tee on Water 1966, 28). The report called for the combination of water 
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rights and water quality regulation in a single entity. In 1967, the State 
Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) was created, combining the 
functions of the SWRB and the water pollution agency. In 1972, when 
the federa l Clean Water Act mandated state water pollution regulation 
under EPA oversight, the SWRCB became the state's designated water 
pollution regulation agency and its water rights agency. 
The SWRCB started off energetically, but then bogged down. Its first 
Delta decision, D-1379 in 1971, strengthened the conditions imposed 
earlier for salinity control and fish protection, and introduced new 
water quality standards to protect agricultural and urban uses in the 
Delta. But before the decision could be implemented, it was stayed by a 
suit challenging the SWRCB's authority to impose conditions on per-
mits held by Reclamation as a federal agency. The U.S. Supreme Court 
resolved the legal issue in the SWRCB's favor in July 1978. In August 
1978, the SWRCB issued D-1485 together with a Delta water quality 
control plan . These further strengthened water quality standards and 
introduced monitoring for compliance. To ensure that Delta water qual-
ity would not be impaired by the projects, D-148 5 required them to 
release water and/or curtail diversions if the flow into the Delta would 
otherwise be insufficient.27 It was greeted with a barrage of lawsuits 
from water users. In 1986, a California Court of Appeal ruling dis-
missed the challenges to the SWRCB's authority. 
By then, compared to the SWRB in 1956, the SWRCB had powerful 
tools in its water rights arsenal. As Gray (chapter 4, this volume) shows, 
California courts used the reasonable use doctrine, revived by the 1967 
Joslin decision, to enhance the SWRCB's regulatory jurisdiction with a 
reasonableness criterion responsive to changing circumstances. The 
1986 Appeal Court rnling held that D-148 5 was too narrow. While, 
under water law, the SWRCB had respected vested nonproject rights in 
conditioning project permits, under its water quality authority it could 
regulate all water users to ensure a reasonable level of water quality 
protection. Both sources of authority should be exploited. And the pub-
lic trust doctrine, upheld in the 1983 National A11dubo11 ruling, gave the 
SWRCB power to overturn settled water rights if subsequently found to 
violate the public trust, including protection of environmental resources . 
Thus armed, a more ambitious SWRCB reopened its decision process. 
A draft report in November 1988 called for a "California Water Ethic" 
with more vigorous urban and agricultural conservation, a cap on Delta 
exports, and tighter water quality standards. The water users howled, 
and the governor pressured the SWRCB to withdraw the draft and let the 
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parties negotiate among themselves. Following agreement between urban 
and environmental, but not agricultural, interests, the SWRCB issued a 
draft decision, D-1630, which limited exports in dry years and required 
additional fish flows. At the behest of agricultural users, the governor 
vetoed the decision in April 1993, leaving D-148 5 still in place. 
Now the EPA intervened, threatening to impose its own water qual-
ity standards for the Delta. An eleventh-hour agreement averted this in 
1994, establishing CALFED, a collaborative planning process overseen 
by state and federal agencies and key stakeholders, largely sidelining the 
SWRCB.28 CALFED produced some positive results, including scientific 
investigations, but no agreement. Native fish species continued a steep 
decline, with no simple remedy in sight. With leadership changes in 
Washington and Sacramento, the political support and funding that had 
sustained CALFED a decade earlier evaporated, and it was terminated 
in 2006 (Hanemann and Dyckman 2009). 
CALFED was blamed for failing to reverse the Delta ecosystem's 
decline or to improve supply reliability for water users. Yet CALFED had 
no power to limit diversions or set water quality standards-those pow-
ers remained with the SWRCB. The SWRCB is tasked with "the orderly 
and efficient administration of the water resources of the state" (Water 
Code, Article 174). It has "primary responsibility" for implementing the 
reasonable use doctrine and for ensuring "meaningful implementation of 
the public trust" (Robie 2012a, 117 5-76). It has not lived up to those 
obligations, instead displaying chronic passivity and regularly deferring 
to hoped-for stakeholder agreement.29 Why? The water rights section 
was, and is, chronically understaffed for both water use monitoring and 
scientific analysis. The board is under the governor's thumb, whether 
indirectly or through his open intervention. Governors, kowtowing to 
water users, have controlled the board.Jo This is a political failure: a lack 
of political will to ensure that the board's regulatory functions are per-
formed. 
The S\WCB's weakness affects not only permits and water quality 
standards but also the enforcement of water rights generally.Ji Riparian 
and pre-1914 rights remain largely unverified and unquantified. Com-
pliance inspections of diverters during 1998-2003 found that 3 8 per-
cent were in violation of their water rights, and another r r percent were 
subject to revocation for nonuse. In three watersheds, an inspection 
found 50 percent of small reservoirs diverting without a right (Califor-
nia State Water Resources Control Board 2008, 6). Besides personnel, 
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does not possess sufficient authority to effectively monitor and enforce 
water right laws . ... In particular, the law does not (r) provide clear 
authority for SWRCB to require monitoring by diverters, (2) authorize 
monetary penalties for monitoring and reporting violations, (3) have 
adequate penalties for unauthorized diversions and violations of cease 
and desist order, and (4) have provisions for interim relief" (8). 
ANEW ERA? 
Around 200 5, new concerns arose that the Delta was in crisis due to 
ecosystem decline and levee vulnerability to seismic and erosion risks. 
Levee failure could permit massive saltwater intrusion, jeopardizing 
water exports to the south. In March 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger 
appointed a Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Task Force, mandating a report 
by November 2007 and a strategic plan by October 2008. Legislation 
implementing those recommendations was introduced in February 
2009, but bogged down amid water user opposition. It emerged, some-
what shorn, in the last hours of the session in November 2009. It estab-
lished "the two coequal goals of providing a more reliable water supply 
for California, and protecting, restoring and enhancing the Delta eco-
system." To that end, a Delta Stewardship Council was created, tasked 
with developing a comprehensive Delta Plan. It created a \Xlatermaster 
for the Delta, appointed by the SWRCB and the Delta Stewardship 
Council, to "exercise the [SWRCB's] authority to provide timely moni-
toring and enforcement of [the SWRCB's] orders and . . . permit terms." 
It introduced penalties for failure to file diversion reports, removed the 
reporting exemption for in-Delta diverters, and authorized additional 
enforcement staff for the SWRCB. Missing were increased penalties for 
illegal water diversions, enhanced SWRCB enforcement authority, and 
independent power to initiate an adjudication.32 
The Delta Watermaster has displayed vigor and independence in 
monitoring diversions and enforcing water rights in the Delta . Compli-
ance with the diversion-reporting requirement is now 99 percent in the 
Delta, and 70 to 8 5 percent elsewhere. Overall, however, the S\'VRCB's 
monitoring and enforcement authority for water rights remain "weak" 
and "inconsistent with its broad enforcement authority over water 
quality" (Wilson 2012, 3, 10) . 
Yet, following the declaration of a drought emergency in January 
20 1 4, the SWRCB has shown unaccustomed forcefulness, more than in 
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In the 1977 drought, the SWRCB sent out 4,858 notices of shortage 
on various streams. Based on projections of summer demand and 
streamflow, the notices identified time periods when each broad user 
category (riparian, pre-1914 or post-1914) could take no water or had 
to reduce diversions by a given percentage. However, lacking the author-
ity to supervise water distribution, the SWRCB relied for enforcement 
on complaints received and field visits. In May 2014, based on similar 
projections of demand and streamflow, the SWRCB issued 8,596 notices 
of curtailment for all post-1914 rights in the Sacramento-San Joaquin 
watershed, requiring submission of curtailment certification within 
seven days.33 There was only a 29-percent response. Invoking its reason-
able use authority, the SWRCB adopted emergency regulations in July 
to streamline and better enforce curtailment, subjecting noncertification 
of future curtai lment to a penalty of $500 per day.34 It also adopted 
emergency regulations mandating urban water suppliers to impose con-
servation measures equivalent to limiting outdoor use to two days per 
week, with monthly monitoring reports required. 
These actions also exposed the SWRCB's weaknesses. Commenters 
complained that the proposed 2014 emergency regulations were illegal if 
applied to riparian or pre-1914 rights. By disregarding individual facts 
and circumstances and making a blanket determination of unreasonable 
use for a broad user category, the S\VRCB had violated due process. The 
shortage projections were unreliable because the SWRCB's diversion 
data were incomplete (prc-1914 data lacks priority dates), unverified, 
and inaccurate. The curtailments shielded the projects from their existing 
responsibility to meet Delta water quality standards, and were an attempt 
to shift that responsibility to other users without a formal decision proc-
ess. It is presently unknown whether those objections will be litigated 
and sustained. Also unknown is whether the SWRCB's new forcefulness 
will continue when the drought ends. 
CONCLUSION 
California started out with a surface water right that was extremely 
unsuited to its location in a semi-arid region with highly variable stream 
flow. While still keeping the riparian right, it invented another type of 
water r ight, the appropriative right, which became the standard in the 
other Western states. As originally implemented in California, the appro-
priative right lacked effective recording, quantification or enforcement. 
Other states discovered this once they emulated California's system, but 
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they soon instituted reforms that made the appropriative right more 
functional. The reforms provided a usable record of who had rights and 
with what seniority, and an apparatus on the ground for monitoring 
diversions and enforcing seniority. Moreover, while appropriative rights 
obtained earlier were initially grandfathered, they were subsequently 
brought into compliance with the new administrative system. In Califor-
nia, by contrast, reform of appropriative rights was long blocked by 
water users and arrived relatively late, in 1914. When California acted, 
what it did was limited. There was recording of post-19 14 rights but not 
supervision of the distribution of water to ensure conformity with those 
rights. Pre-1914 rights stayed outside the authority of the SWRCB and 
its predecessors; they still remain unquantified in many cases, and they 
require litigation to quantify or enforce them. Riparian rights are also 
outside the SWRCB's authority, and they are unenforceable and unquan-
tifiable except through litigation. A systematic quantification of surface 
water rights in California's Central Valley would require a statutory 
adjudication or something equivalent. This was mooted several times, 
including in 1939, 1942, and 195T, but was rejected as too time-con-
swning. Seventy-five years later, it is still needed. 
The system of water rights affects the allocation of surface water in 
several ways. It hinders the re-allocation of water through water mar-
keting. Riparian rights can be transferred to nonriparian land only 
through guile. Without more formal verification, unquantified or poorly 
quantified appropriative rights can be leased short-term but not leased 
long-term or permanently transferred. Hence, the vast majority of water 
marketing in California has been restricted to short-term leases. When 
there is a drought, the system's weaknesses show up. In past droughts, 
water suppliers and users have worked things out informally among 
themselves, sidelining the SWRCB or its predecessors and largely 
bypassing seniority. When the SWRCB did attempt to enforce seniority, 
it acted in a simplistic manner: in the 1977 and 2014 droughts, it treated 
all post-1914 r ights as the same without regard to seniority within the 
category. (It did the same in 1977 for pre-1914 rights, treating them as 
a homogeneous category.) The lack of data on quantities associated 
with water rights and on actual diversions left no alternative. The sys-
tem performs worst with regard to the allocation of water between 
instream and off-stream uses. Large-scale diversions have been occur-
ring from the Delta since 1949, but there is still no authoritative deter-
mination of responsibility for meeting Delta water quality objectives. 
The SWRCB has relied so far on restricting CVP and SWP diversions to 
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meet those objectives, despite the 1986 Appeal Court ruling that it 
could regulate all water users to ensure a reasonable level of water qual-
ity protection in the Delta. As the demand for water in California grows, 
as the Delta ecosystem declines, and as drought becomes more common 
with climate change, the SWRCB's failure to exercise its full legal 
authority will become increasingly burdensome and costly. 
NOTES 
I. Space precludes discussion of groundwater rights in California. Put sim-
ply, that situation has been even worse, although legislation enacted in Septem-
ber 2014 may eventually lead to some effective regulation of groundwater over-
draft. 
2. That restriction was not initially enforced in California. 
3. Some of these details emerged gradually through court rulings 111 the 
period 1897-1927. 
4. Meade (1903, 199-202) provides several examples where, between 1860 
and 1890, ditch companies lost their entire investmen ts because they were una-
ware of superior appropriative rights elsewhere on the stream. 
5. ln order to secure a complete and consistent settlement of water rights to a 
stream, all potential claimants must be brought into the same suit, either through 
a suit to quiet title or through a procedure known as a stream adjudication. 
6. The states adopting appropriative rights as the only form of surface water 
right were Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming. The states maintaining a dual system of riparian and appropriative 
rights were Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and 
Washington (relatively humid, non-mining states). 
7. Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, Idaho, the Dakotas, New Mexico, and Arizona . 
8. The court ruled that under certain conditions that did not hold in this 
case-if the appropriator began using water from a stream before a riparian 
acquired his property-the appropriation doctrine would prevail. 
9. United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 
82 (1986), p. 170 (italics in original). 
10. Wiel (1914, 446), states that " there was a promise of opposition to the 
bill if such provisions went into it." 
1r. Wiel (1914, 446); Chandler (19r3, 162, 168). Chandler comments, 
"There is little use in securing an adjudication unless properly authorized offi-
cia ls are charged with the regulation of headgates in accordance therewith." 
12. The commission originally had authority over riparian rights in a statu-
tory adjudication; that authority was removed in 1917. It had authority over 
riparian rights in a court reference if the court so decided. 
13. Under the 1913 act, the commission (or division) was authorized to initi-
ate an adjudication on its own authority. As of 1922, this authority had never 
been exercised (Division of Water Rights 1922, 8). It was never exercised sub-
sequently, either. 
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14. Division of Water Rights (1924, 38). Another modification in 1923 
changed the filing fee from a flat charge to a fee that varied according to the 
amount of water applied for. This "played an important role in eliminating 
many purely speculative filings" (Division of Water Rights 1926, 26). 
15. The legislation waived the diligence requirement that these rights be 
exercised within a fixed period or be lost. 
16. These users received what were called water service contracts. 
17. These contractors arc exchange contractors, because they exchanged 
their right to river water for CVP deliveries. 
18. These contractors are settle111e11t contractors. The SW'P also has some 
settlement contractors on the Feather River. 
19 . Following litigation, owners of land along the dewatered San Joaquin 
River segment received compensation for the loss of their land value. 
20. Authority to prevent unreasonable use of water remained exclusively 
with the Department of Water Resources until 1971. 
21. Starting with the 1924 drought, there had been an annual inventory of 
individual diversions in the Central Valley. This ceased in 1956. 
22. For post-1914 rights, the "face value" (maximum diversion) is known, 
but the amount actually diverted is "only a fraction of face value" and is "unde-
termined" (California State Water Resources Control Board 2008, 4). 
23. Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law (1978, 
18). During the 1977 drought, the SWRCB received about 150 complaints of 
illegal diversions or violations of permit terms. Upon investigation, 30 cases 
were found to merit enforcement actions. This was "the first time since enact-
ment of the Water Commission Act in 1914 that the State has enforced its 
jurisdiction to enjoin illegal diverters" (Division of Water Rights 1978, 18). 
24. The Governor's Commission (1978, 26) suggested that, once signed, the 
settlement and exchange contracts provided de facto quantification of the ripar-
ian and pre-1914 rights of CVP contractors . But those contracts represented a 
judgment by an agency (Reclamation) that lacked the authority to determine 
water rights in California. Similarly with the S\VP contracts signed by the 
Department of Water Resources. Olson and Mahaney (2005, 82), staff counsel 
to SWRB's successor, reject the commission's suggestion: "Various agencies 
conducted studies in order to make assumptions regarding the physical charac-
teristics involved, including estimates of existing water rights. However, these 
studies did not determine actual water rights, and clearly state that assumptions 
may differ substantially from the actual rights as determined in a court or by the 
[SWRB]." 
25. In 1959, the SWRB received formal authority to reserve jurisdiction to 
modify or delete terms when issuing CVP and SWP permits. 
26. See Hanemann and Dyckman (2009), who argue that the negotiations 
are a zero-sum game, thus inherently incapable of yielding a stable bargaining 
outcome. 
27. In 1981, the SWRCB added a condition, Term 91, prohibiting users jun-
ior to the projects from making diversions when stored project water was being 
released to meet Delta quality standards. First seen as an interim measure pend-
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made permanent when that approach was abandoned "due to lack of adequate 
data," this condition was applied to permits with post-1978 rights, and subse-
quently to some post-1965 permits. Invoked almost every year since 1984, it 
covers only 233 out of 5,500 diverters, and enforcement is limited. 
28. In 199 5 the SWRCB adopted a Delta Water Quality Plan with new 
standards for fish and wildlife, based on recommendations agreed to by the par-
ties. It planned a water rights hearing to allocate responsibility for meeting 
flow-dependent objectives, but canceled this "to facilitate negotiations" that 
might lead to a settlement among the parries, meanwhile leaving the CVP and 
SWP with ultimate responsibility for those objectives (D-1641, WRO-2001-
05). Despite legal challenges, the decision was largely upheld in 2006, except 
that the court ruled that the SWRCB could not substitute flow objectives agreed 
to by the parties for those in the 199 5 plan. 
29. See Robie (2012b, 9-n): "the Board has been too timid in its leadership, 
and overall has been a disappointment ... . It remains critical for the [SWRCB] to 
take a more active role in applying the reasonable use and public trust doctrines 
... of its OI/Jn accord . ... I urge the Board to be more proactive, more bold . .. 
in fulfilling its adjudicatory and regulatory functions." Also see Nawi and Mac-
Millan (2008, 4): "When [the SWRCB] has taken effective action, this has tended 
to be the result of consensus reached by parties outside the Board's process." 
30. The formulation currently used by the governor's staff when telling you 
that you are off the board is: "The space is needed for someone else." 
31. From 1983 to about 2000, Sawyer (2005, 36) notes, the SWRCl3 "was 
less interested in water right enforcement" due partly to gubernatorial direc-
tives and partly to staff shortages, as personnel were reallocated from enforce-
ment to other tasks . (Staffing resources, of course, also reflect gubernatorial 
priorities.) Interest in enforcement revived somewhat thereafter. 
32. The last was recommended, to no avail, by the Governor's Commission 
in 1978 as well as by the Delta Task Force in 2008 . 
33. The notice warned that, if current conditions continue, the SWRCB 
might also curtail pre-1914 and riparian diversions. 
34. The draft regulations applied to all diverters, including pre-1914 and 
riparians; pre-1914 and riparian rights were omitted from the version adopted . 
REFERENCES 
Bain, Joe S., Richard E. Caves, and Julius Margolis. 1966. Northern Califor-
nia's Water lnd11stry. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press. 
California Assembly Interim Committee on Water. 1966. A Proposed \Ylater 
Resu11rces Cu11trul Board fur California: A Staff St11dy. Sacramento. 
California State Water Commission. 1917. Report of the State Water Co111111is-
sion of California. Sacramento . 
---. 1918. Second Biennial Report of the State Water Commission of Cali-
fornia, L!JT?-r918. Sacramento. 
---. 1921. Third Biennial Report of the State Water Commission of Califor-
nia, 1919-1920. Sacramento. 
California's Flawed Surface Water Rights I 81 
California State Water Resources Board. r9 5 r. Water Resources of Califomia. 
13ulletin No. 1. Sacramento. 
California Srate Water Resources Control Board. 2008. Letter from Dorothy 
Rice, Executive Director, to John Kirlin, Executive Director, Delta Vision 
Task Force, May 12, 2008. Sacramento. 
California State Water Rights Board. r9 57. A1111ual Report of the State Water 
Rights Board of the State of California, Covering Period July 5, c956 to June 
30, 1957. Sacramento. 
Chandler, Alfred E. 1913. "The 'Water Bill' Proposed by the Conservation 
Commission of California." California Law Review 1:148-68. 
Clay, Karen, and Gavin Wright. 2005. "Order without Law? Property Rights dur-
ing the California Gold Rush." Explorations in Economic History 42:15 5-83. 
Division of Engineering and Irrigation, California Department of Public Works. 
1927. Summary Report 0 11 the Water Resources of California and a Coordi-
nated Plan for their Develop111e11t. Bulletin No. 12. Sacramento. 
Division of Resource Planning, California Department of Water Resources. 
1957. The California Water Plan. Bulletin No. 3. Sacramento. 
Division of Water Resources, Ca lifornia Department of Public Works. 1931. 
Report to Legislature of r93 r 011 State Water Plan, 1930. Bulletin No. 30. 
Sacramento. 
Division of Water Rights, California Department of Public Works. 1922. Report 
of the Division of Water Rights, November 1, 1922. Sacramento. 
---. 1924. Biennial Report of the Division of Water Rights, November 1 , 
1924. Sacramento. 
---. 1926. Biennial Report of the Division of Water Rights, November r, 
1926. Sacramento. 
Division of Water Rights, California State Water Resources Control Board. 
1978. Drought 77 Dry Year Program. Sacramento. 
Dunbar, Robert G. 1983. Forging New Rights i11 Western Waters. Lincoln: Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press. 
Garone, Philip. 2011. The Fall and Rise of the \Yletla11ds of California's Great 
Central Valley. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law. 1978. Final 
Report. Sacramento. 
Graham, Leland 0 . 1950. "The Central Valley Project: Resource Development 
of a Natural Basin." Califomia Law Review 38:588-637. 
Hanemann, Michael, and Caitlin Dyckman. 2009. "The San Francisco Bay-
Delta: A Failure of Decision-Making Capacity." Environmental Science and 
Policy 12:710-25. 
Hobbs, Gregory J. 1999. "Colorado's 1969 Adjudication and Administration 
Act: Settling In." University of Denver Water Law Review 3:1-19. 
Holsinger, Henry. 1942. "Necessity for Comprehensive Adjudication of Water 
Rights on the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers in Aid of the Central Val-
ley Project." Memorandum dated December 2. Sacramento: Ca lifornia State 
\'Vater Resources Control Board archives. 
---. 1957. "Procedures and Practice before the California State Water 
Rights Board." California Law Review 45:676-87. 
82 I Chapter Three 
Meade, Elwood. I903. Irrigation Institutions. New York: Macmillan. 
Miller, M. Catherine. 198 5. "Riparian Rights and the Control of Water in Cal -
ifornia, I879-1928: The Relationship between Agricultural Enterprise and 
Legal Change." Agricultural History 59:I-24. 
---. t989. "Water Rights and the Bankruptcy of Judicia l Action: The Case 
of Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison." Pacific Historical Review 
58:83- 107. 
---. I992. Flooding the Courtrooms. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Nawi, David, and Jeannette MacMillan. 2008 . Aut/Jurity and Effectiveness of 
the State Water Resources Control Board. Report to the Delta Vision Com-
mittee. Sacramento. 
Olson, Samantha K., and Erin K.L. Mahaney. 2005. "Searching for Certainty 
in a State of Flux: How Administrative Procedures Help Provide Stability in 
Water Rights Law." McGeorge Law Review 36:73-115. 
Pisani, Donald J. 1984. Fro111 the Family Farm to Agribusiness. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press. 
---. 2002. Water and American Government. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press. 
Robie, Ronald B. 2012a. "Effective Implementation of the Public Trust Doc-
trine in California Water Resources Decision-Making: A View from the 
Bench." UC Davis Law Review 45:n55- 76. 
Robie, Ronald B. 20I2b. What ls, What Has Been, and \Ylhat Ought To 
Be. Ann ]. Schneider Memoria l Lecrnre, University of California, Davis, 
May 1. 
Rhode, Paul W. 1995. "Learning, Capital Accumulation, and the Transforma-
tion of Ca lifornia Agriculrn re." journal of Economic History 5 5:773-800. 
SaW}'er, Andrew H. 2005. "Improving Efficiency Incrementally: The Governor's 
Commission Attacks \Vaste and Unreasonable Use." McGeorge Law Review 
36:209- 52 . 
Squillace, Mark. 1989. "A Critica l Look at Wyoming Water Law. " Land and 
Water Law Review 24:307-46. 
- --. 199 r. "One Hundred Years of Wyoming Water Law. " Land and \Ylater 
Law Review 26:93- Io1. 
Tarlock, A. Dan. 2000. "Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?" 
North Dakota Law Review 76:881- 910. 
Wiel, Samuel C. 1914. "Determination of \Vater Titles and the \Xlater Commis-
sion Bill." California Law Review 2:43 5-49. 
Wilson, Craig M. 2012. lmproving Water Right Enforcement Authority. Report 
to the State Water Resources Control Board and the Delta Stewardship 
Council, September 19. Sacramento, CA. 
